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The Elusive Common Good 
Religion and Civil Society in Massachusetts, 1780-1833 
JOHANN N. NEEM 
In 1810, Theophilus Parsons, the Federalist chief justice of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court, argued that the state need not recog- 
nize voluntary churches, calling the idea "too absurd to be admitted." In 
contrast, the modern idea of civil society is premised on the right of 
individual citizens to associate and for their institutions to gain the legal 
privileges connected with incorporation.' Federalists did not share this 
idea. They believed that in a republic the people's interests and the 
state's interests were the same, since voters elected their own rulers. 
Johann N. Neem, Assistant Professor of History, Western Washington Univer- 
sity, is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center on Religion and Democracy at the 
University of Virginia. At Virginia, he thanks his adviser Peter S. Onuf, Michael 
F. Holt, Stephen Innes, Joseph Kett, Charles W. McCurdy, Allan Megill, and 
Heather Warren. He also thanks John L. Brooke, Peter S. Field, David Hammack, 
Mark Y. Hanley, Richard John, Ted Kilsdonk, Albrecht Koschnik, Mark D. Mc- 
Garvie, Leonard Sadosky, Brian Schoen, John L. Thomas, Gordon S. Wood, 
Conrad Edick Wright, and the anonymous readers for the JER. Support for this 
essay was provided by dissertation fellowships from the Social Science Research 
Council's Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector and the Aspen Insti- 
tute Nonprofit Sector Research Fund. 
1. Michael Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society" Dissent (Spring 1991), 293- 
304. For a history of the idea of civil society, see John Keane, "Despotism and 
Democracy: The Origins of the Distinction between Civil Society and the State, 
1750-1850" in Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives, ed. John 
Keane (London, 1988), 35-71; John Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The Critical His- 
tory of an Idea (New York, 1999); Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society 
(Princeton, 1992); Marvin B. Becker, The Emergence of Civil Society in the Eigh- 
teenth Century: A Privileged Moment in the History of England, Scotland, and 
France (Bloomington, 1994). 
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Private groups threatened the Federalists' vision by dividing the popula- 
tion. The freedom of association was not considered a right, but a privi- 
lege extended to certain institutions that served the common good. One 
of the most important of these institutions was the parochial church, 
which Massachusetts supported with taxes until 1833. Other churches, 
as Parsons implied, served no positive civic good. After disestablishment 
in 1833, however, all churches became private associations. Moreover, 
by the 1830s, citizens of Massachusetts had joined associations to carry 
out all kinds of reform activity.2 This essay relies on debates over the 
relationship between churches and the state to trace the emergence of an 
independent civil society and to suggest some of the new conflicts that 
emerged within it. 
Recent work on the public sphere and civil society provides a new 
context to think about religion in Massachusetts. Historians have demon- 
strated the importance of activities in civil society for defining who "the 
people" are and what they believe in." For example, in public ceremon- 
ies, Mary P. Ryan writes, citizens are organized, or organize themselves, 
2. Richard D. Brown, "Emergence of Urban Society in Rural Massachusetts, 
1760-1820," Journal of American History, 61 (June 1974), 29-51. 
3. My understanding of the historiography of the early American public sphere 
has been greatly aided by John L. Brooke, "Consent, Civil Society, and the Public 
Sphere in the Age of Revolution and the Early American Republic: Thoughts on 
Rousseau, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Habermias" (unpublished manuscript 
cited with l)ermission of author). I thank him for sharing it with me. See Mary P. 
Ryan, Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825-1880 (Baltimore, 
1990), esp. 130-71, and Civic Wars: Democracy and Public Life in the American 
City during the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, CA, 1997); Michael Warner, The 
Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century 
America (Cambridge, 1990); David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: 
The Making of American Nationalism (Chapel Hill, 1997); Simon P. Newman, 
Parades and Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early American Republic 
(Philadelphia, 1997); Christopher Grasso, A Speaking Aristocracy: Transforming 
Public Discourse in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut (Chapel Hill, 1999); Albrecht 
Kosclhnik, "Voluntary Associations, Political Culture, and the Public Sphere in 
Philadelphia, 1780-1830" (Ph.D. diss.: University of Virginia, 2000). Although 
he does not fralne his argument in terms of the public sphere, Sean Wilentz, 
Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 
1788-1850 (New York, 1984), esp. 87-90, discusses the symbolic importance of 
parades for artisans. 
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"to learn, invent, and practice a common language that could be con- 
verted to other civic or political uses."4 Public activities could foster a 
"common language," but they could also be "converted" to other uses. 
For this reason, Federalists in Massachusetts worried that self-created 
groups in civil society would undermine the idea that there existed one 
people with shared interests. They believed that all citizens must put 
aside their own interests and defer to the common good. Dissent or 
division of any kind in the public sphere was to be avoided at all costs." 
Most historians of the early national public sphere have largely ignored 
the state and the role of law and public policy in defining the contours 
of civil society and its public sphere, yet the state, through its power to 
incorporate and to determine which associations would be legally recog- 
nized, was a vital force in shaping civil society.6 Those who have exam- 
ined the activities of political elites have found that postrevolutionary 
leaders, especially but not only Federalists, were actively engaged in 
managing the public sphere, including deciding which associations and 
4. Ryan, Civic Wars, 15. 
5. John L. Brooke, "Ancient Lodges and Self-Created Societies: Voluntary As- 
sociation and the Public Sphere in the Early Republic," in Launching the Extended 
Republic: The Federalist Era, ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottes- 
ville, VA, 1996), 273-377; Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federal- 
ism (New York, 1993), 451-88; David S. Shields, "Anglo-American Clubs: Their 
Wit, Their Heterodoxy, Their Sedition," William and Mary Quarterly, 51 (April 
1994), 293-304; Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dis- 
senting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999); Albrecht 
Koschnik, "The Democratic Societies of Philadelphia and the Limits of the Ameri- 
can Public Sphere, circa 1793-1795," William and Mary Quarterly, 68 (2001), 
615-36; Johann N. Neem, "Freedom of Association in the Early Republic: The 
Republican Party, the Whiskey Rebellion, and the Philadelphia and New York 
Cordwainers' Cases," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 127 (July 
2003), 259-90. 
6. For the role of the state in shaping civil society, see Michael Schudson, 
"The 'Public Sphere' and its Problems: Bringing the State (Back) In," Notre Dame 
Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 8 (1994), 529-46; Theda Skocpol, 
Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson, "A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional 
Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States," American Political Science 
Review, 94 (Sept. 2000), 527-46; William J. Novak, "The American Law of Asso- 
ciation: The Legal-Political Construction of Civil Society," Studies in American 
Political Development, 15 (Fall 2001), 163-88. 
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institutions to patronize and which to condemn.7 At stake was not only 
what groups should be permitted to exist, but also what kind of society 
the new republic would be. 
Federalists argued that the state should provide tax support to the 
parochial Congregational Church because public religion was vital to 
creating a citizenry with shared values. Moral conflict, realized in the 
competition between groups in civil society, threatened the common 
good by implying that "the people" need not or did not share the same 
values. Federalists tried to limit the rights of voluntary dissenting 
churches by denying them corporate privileges.8 Debates over the legal 
rights of voluntary churches therefore became part of a broader discus- 
sion about the relationship between civil society and the state, and vice 
versa."? In order to accept the proliferation of and the competition be- 
7. Brooke, "Ancient Lodges and Self-Created Societies"; Elkins and Mc- 
Kitrick, Age of Federalism, 451-88; Koschnik, "Democratic Societies of Philadel- 
phia"; Neemn, "Freedom of Association in the Early Republic." 
8. In Massachusetts, the shift that Sidney E. Mead describes as being "from 
coercion to persuasion" was more difficult than Mead suggests. The principle of 
"voluntaryism" was not easily accepted by Massachusetts's Federalist leaders. See 
Mead's The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America (New 
York, 1963). 
9. This essay builds on and contributes to recent work by historians of the 
nonprofit sector, who have turned to corporate law in order to understand the 
different legal environments under which American nonprofit institutions have 
operated. See Peter Dobkin Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 1700- 
1900: Private Institutions, Elites and the Origins of American Nationality (New 
York, 1982), and Inventing the Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on Philanthropy, 
Voluntarism, and Nonprofit Organizations (Baltimore, MD, 1992); David Ham- 
miack, ed., Making the Nonprofit Sector in the United States: A Reader (Blooming- 
ton, IN, 1998), and "Nonprofit Organizations in American History: Research 
Opportumnities and Sources," American Behavioral Scientist, 45 (2002), 1638-74; 
Bruce A. Camlpbell, "Social Federalism: The Constitutional Position of Nonprofit 
Corporations in Nineteenth-Century America," Law and History Review, 8 
(1990), 149-88; Lawrence J. Friedmian and Mark D. McGarvie, eds., Charity, 
Philanthropy, and Civility in American History (Cambridge, UK, 2003); Johann 
N. Neemi, "Politics and the Origins of the Nonprofit Corporation in Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire, 1780-1820," Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32 
(Sept. 2003), 344-65. 
These works, in turn, expand upon older histories of corporations that focused 
primlarily on economnic and not civic institutions. I rely particularly on Edwin 
Merrick Dodd, American Business Corporations until 1860, with Special Reference 
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tween interests-what Gordon S. Wood calls an "American science of 
politics"-and the moral and political diversity they implied, Massachu- 
setts leaders needed to construct a new conceptual space in which com- 
petition could take place. In essence, civil society, not just the church, 
had to be disestablished."' 
The idea of the common good was never abandoned. Instead, an 
independent civil society opened up a new arena in which private groups 
could promote it. In the 1820s and 1830s, religious leaders who sup- 
ported disestablishment turned to voluntary associations to promote so- 
cial and political reforms that they believed served the common good. 
Citizens argued that it was their right to organize in civil society to influ- 
ence public opinion and to pressure lawmakers. Yet many of these 
groups, by seeking to impose their own vision of the good on others, 
threatened the very civil society that had made their own organizing 
possible. Political leaders, having accepted the separation of church and 
state, and of civil society and state, now wondered what to do when 
powerful interest groups sought to effect political change from within 
civil society. By the 1830s, there were more people promoting more 
common goods than ever. 
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 established a "commonwealth" 
or a government actively committed to promoting the common good." 
to Massachusetts (Cambridge, 1954); Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, 
Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy. 
Massachusetts 1774-1861 (Cambridge, 1969); Pauline Maier, "The Revolutionary 
Origins of the American Corporation," William and Mary Quarterly, 50 (1993), 
51-84. 
10. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 
(New York, 1969), esp. 608. In their classic work, Commonwealth, Oscar and 
Mary Handlin argue that conflicts between corporate interests and the state were 
vital to the formation of a separate realm for independent, albeit regulated, market 
activity. I extend their insight into the realm of civic associations in civil society. 
11. Many historians have commented on the communitarian character of the 
Massachusetts Constitution. See Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, 3-31; 
Ronald Peters, Jr., The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact 
(Amherst, MA, 1978); Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Re- 
publican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary 
Era, trans. Rita and Robert Kimber (1973; trans.: Chapel Hill, NC, 1980); Donald 
S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge, LA, 1988). 
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The primary distinction between a modern liberal democracy and a 
commonwealth is that in a commonwealth the whole is prior to the parts. 
According to Theophilus Parsons in the "Essex Result" (1778), written 
as a critique of an earlier proposed constitution, "when men form them- 
selves into society, and erect a body politic, they are to be considered 
as one moral whole.""2 This "moral whole" was the will of the people 
themselves. Throughout the revolutionary era, political leaders and min- 
isters echoed these sentiments. In their address to the public, delegates 
to the state constitutional convention affirmed that "the interest of the 
Society is common to all its Members."''3 If ratified, the new constitution 
would establish a polity committed to securing this common interest. 
The delegates were not naive; they understood that society was com- 
posed of multiple interests, but they hoped to create a political system 
that could overcome them. The constitution's primary draftsman, John 
Adams, believed that a well-constructed constitution could minimize the 
influence of minority interests.14 The constitution was divided into two 
parts. The Declaration of Rights delineated those individual and com- 
munal rights fundamental to liberty; the Frame of Government provided 
for the organization of the various branches of government. To ensure 
that the people understood their own interests, chapter 5 of the Frame 
of Government obliged the state to support educational institutions, 
charities, and literary and scientific societies. 
1 The revolutionary genera- 
tion believed that the people must be virtuous if the republic was to 
survive; only by learning their true interests would they favor the com- 
mon good.'" 
12. [Theoplilus Parsons] "Essex Result" (1778) in Oscar Handlin and Mary 
Flug Handlin, eds., Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Mas- 
sachusetts Constitution of 1780 (Cambridge, MA, 1966), 330. See also Henry 
Cuminigs, "A Sermon Preached before His Honor Thomas Cushing .. ." (Boston, 
1783). 
13. Journal of the Convention for Framing a Constitution of Government for 
the State of Massachusetts Bay (Boston, 1832), 216-17. 
14. C. Bradley Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty (Lawrence, 
KS, 1998); Richard Adam Samuelson, "The Adams Family and the American 
Experiment" (Ph.D. diss.: University of Virginia, 2000). 
15. Journal of the Convention; The constitution is also reprinted in Handlin 
and Handlin, Popular Sources, 441-72. 
16. Lawrence Cremiin, American Education: The National Experience, 1783- 
1876 (New York, 1980); Richard D. Brown, The Strength of a People: The Idea 
of an Informed Citizenry in America, 1650-1870 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996). 
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Various articles in the Declaration of Rights dealt specifically with the 
question of how to protect the common good from being threatened by 
private or partial interests. The two most important for civil society are 
articles 3 and 6. Article 6 reads, "no man, nor corporation or association 
of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and ex- 
clusive privileges, distinct from those of the community.""17 Although 
chapter 5 of the Frame of Government committed Massachusetts to 
patronizing civic institutions, article 6 ensured that the government's pa- 
tronage would extend only to institutions that promoted the common 
good. Organizations in civil society were to be dependent on the state 
for legitimacy and legal rights. Rather than permitting an autonomous 
civil society where any group could associate to pursue their goals, the 
state served as gatekeeper. 
One of the most important institutions in Massachusetts was the 
church. Since the settling of the Bay Colony, the parochial church 
formed the heart of the moral community. Over time, the growth of 
religious dissent threatened the status of the Congregationalists, but the 
ideals of the covenant remained powerful enough to find voice in the 
new constitution. Because the freedom of conscience was a fundamental 
right, article 2 of the Declaration of Rights guaranteed it to all citizens. 
However, article 3 granted the new regime the authority to collect taxes 
for religious purposes and to oblige citizens to attend church services: 
As the happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation of civil govern- 
ment, essentially depend upon piety, religion and morality; and as these cannot be 
generally diffused through a community, but by the institution of the public worship 
of GOD, and of public instructions in piety, religion and morality: Therefore, to 
promote their happiness and to secure the good order and preservation of their 
government, the people of this Commonwealth ave a right to invest their legislature 
with power to authorize and require, and the legislature shall, from time to time, 
authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies- 
17. Journal of the Convention, 194. As radical as article 6 might be, it did not 
go as far as Virginia, which repealed the Elizabethan statute for charitable trusts 
and was hostile to most corporations, nor France, where the republican revolution 
destroyed all corporate privileges of the old regime. See H. Miller, The Legal 
Foundations of American Philanthropy, 1776-1844 (Madison, WI, 1961); Edith 
Archambault, "Historical Roots of the Nonprofit Sector in France," Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30 (2001), 204-20. 
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politic, or religious societies, to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for 
the institution of the public worship of GOD.' 
As with other clauses in the constitution, article 3 was premised on the 
common good. Because republics require virtuous citizens, the public 
church served a vital role by providing all citizens access to moral educa- 
tion. Technically, article 3 permitted taxes to be paid to any church, thus 
ensuring Baptists and other dissenters equal rights. Federalists would 
soon conclude, however, that article 6 prohibited voluntary churches 
from receiving the state's patronage. Article 3, in tandem with article 6, 
was implemented in a manner that limited the rights of religious minori- 
ties in civil society. 
Article 3 was by far the most controversial aspect of the new constitu- 
tion. Historians have divided into two major camps on the issue, camps 
that replicate the debate that took place in 1779-1780. Some historians 
consider article 3 an oppressive throwback to the Puritan past. They see 
it as a handout to Congregational ministers who, besieged by competi- 
tion from dissenters since the Great Awakening, sought the state's aid to 
reassert their authority.'' A second school argues that the primary pur- 
pose of article 3 was not religious but civic. The goal of the church was 
not to establish religious doctrines but to teach the moral values neces- 
sary for a republic.20 
18. Journal of the Convention, 216-17. 
19. Samuel Eliot Morison, "The Struggle over the Ratification of the Constitu- 
tion of 1780," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 50 (1917), 353- 
411; Jacob C. Meyer, Church and State in Massachusetts from 1740 to 1833: A 
Chapter in the History of the Development of Individual Freedom (Cleveland, OH, 
1930), 90-132; Peter S. Field, The Crisis of the Standing Order: Clerical Intellec- 
tuals and Cultural Authority in Massachusetts, 1780-1833 (Amherst, MA, 1998), 
34-46. 
20. Conrad Wright, "Piety, Morality, and the Commonwealth," in The Uni- 
tarian Controversy: Essays on American Unitarian History, ed. Conrad Wright 
(Boston, 1994), 17-35; Charles H. Lippy, "The 1780 Constitution: Religious 
Establishment or Civil Religion?" Journal of Church and State, 20 (Autumn 
1978), 533-49; John Witte, Jr., "'A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of 
Religion': John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment" in Religion and the 
New, 
Republic: Faith in the Founding of America, ed. James H. Hutson (Lanham, 
MD, 2000), 1-40. William G. McLoughlin's authoritative study of church-state 
issues in New England Dissent: 1630-1833: The Baptists and the Separation of 
Church and State, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1971), niotes that both sides have merit 
depenIding on the persplective one took toward religious liberty. 
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The debates in the press over article 3 generally support the second 
school, but the issue remains unresolved. If the public church was simply 
a utilitarian moral institution, why was it included in the Declaration 
of Rights instead of chapter 5 of the Frame of Government, where the 
constitution mandates the government to support other educational insti- 
tutions? The answer is that religion is not like other civic goods because 
it concerns metaphysical questions of right and wrong, the answers to 
which are derived from revealed or natural law. Massachusetts Congre- 
gationalists considered themselves a covenanted people, committed as a 
community to supporting their god's laws. The Revolution reinvigorated 
this tradition. Speaking in their pulpits, before militias, and at public 
meetings, ministers reminded their listeners that their revolution against 
England must be accompanied by a new commitment to the covenant, 
and that their god sanctioned the rebellion in order to protect his people 
from the machinations of the English crown and church." The Reverend 
Samuel Cooper elaborated on the relationship between religion and the 
state in his election sermon preached on October 25, 1780, the day the 
new constitution went into effect. Cooper told his audience that Massa- 
chusetts was settled "as a refuge from tyranny." Like the people of Israel, 
the Puritans were "led into a wilderness" and "pursued through the sea, 
by the armed hand of power." In the new world, they committed them- 
selves to live under their god's laws. The rulers of Massachusetts now 
entered into "a solemn renewal of this covenant."22 To its supporters, 
the public church did not just teach common values, but derived those 
values from a higher source. 
Opponents of article 3 were quick to point out that it violated the 
freedom of conscience. By mandating that citizens support the church, 
the constitution undermined the distinction between "protestantism and 
21. Harry Stout, The New England Soul: Preaching and Religious Culture in 
Colonial New England (New York, 1986); Nathan O. Hatch, The Sacred Cause of 
Liberty: Republican Thought and the Millennium in Revolutionary New England 
(New Haven, CT, 1977); J. C. D. Clark, The Language of Liberty, 1660-1831: 
Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World (Cambridge, 
UK, 1994), 111-25. 
22. Samuel Cooper, "A Sermon preached before His Excellency John Han- 
cock ... being the day of the Commencement of the Constitution and Inaugura- 
tion of the new Government" (Boston, 1780), in Political Sermons of the Founding 
Era, 1730-1805, ed. Ellis Sandoz (Indianapolis, IN, 1991), 627-56. 
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popery.""23 Article 3's most ardent critic, "Philanthropos," worried that 
under the new constitution "the church and State are not barely to be 
brought together, but are to be really united."24 Philanthropos argued 
that civil legislation interferes with the natural tendency of people to 
love their god, "for whenever the magistrate does interfere, law-suits, 
imprisonment and quarreling take place." Rather than promoting social 
harmony and the common good, state supported religion undermined 
it.25 
Baptists were particularly vocal objectors to article 3. Early on, Bap- 
tists had worried that Congregationalists would threaten religious liberty. 
When the 1780 constitution was revealed, Baptists protested the state's 
right to interfere with religious affairs. They believed that the church of 
Christ was distinct in all ways from the polity.2" Under article 3, Baptists 
were required to pay their ministerial taxes, imposing the state between 
the church and its members. The new regime co-opted all churches for 
public purposes. Like other citizens, Baptists were expected to perform 
their civic duties. Although the constitution's supporters argued that 
paying taxes to support the church was a civic obligation, Baptists ar- 
gued that religion was a matter of private conscience beyond the state's 
reach. In making this claim, Baptists challenged the basic premises of 
how the Massachusetts polity was organized.27 In time, Baptist argu- 
ments would prove invaluable to defending the rights of associations, 
thus creating an ideological foundation for an autonomous civil society. 
At the moment, Baptists were on the losing side of the argument. 
23. Boston Gazette, May 13, 1780. See also "Objections of the Minority of the 
Town of Boston," Boston Gazette, May 22, 1780. 
24. Boston Independent Chronicle, Mar. 21, 1780. 
25. Boston Gazette, Jan. 8, 1781. See also Independent Chronicle, Mar. 2, 
1780; Mar. 16, 1780; Mar. 23, 1780; Apr. 6, 1780; Apr. 13, 1780. 
26. In New England Dissent, William G. McLoughlin recovered the pietistic 
origins for the separation of church and state. McLoughlin explained that Baptist 
arguments for separation of church and state were made on behalf of, rather than 
in opposition to, religion. See also Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the 
Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History (Chi- 
cago, 1965). 
27. John L. Brooke, The Heart of the Commonwealth: Society and Political 
Culture in Worcester County, Massachusetts, 1713-1861 (New York, 1989), 158- 
88, argues that by proclaiming the right of individuals to voluntary associate, 
Baptists contrasted a "Lockean" vision of civil society with the "Harringtonian" 
ideals of the Commonwealth's supporters. 
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In response to the above critiques, defenders of article 3 emphasized 
the communitarian benefits of religion. Religion taught virtue, which was 
necessary for the common good. As one writer claimed, the public 
church was "essential to the well being of civil society," for only it could 
prevent "that immorality, and dissipation of manners, which we have 
great reason to fear would take place, if there should no provision be 
made by law for the support and maintenance of public worship and the 
teachers of religion."28 Article 3 would not only ensure a virtuous citi- 
zenry, but also that the parochial minister could speak for a civic com- 
munity that shared the same morals and interests. Under the new 
constitution, ministers were considered civil servants.29 
Massachusetts's ruling Federalist Party was committed to the vision of 
civil society outlined in the new constitution. They supported what John 
L. Brooke calls a "consensual public sphere," in which the institutions 
of civil society reinforce the values and interests of the people.30 By man- 
aging the public sphere, Federalists hoped to create a citizenry with 
shared values that would consent to policies that served the common 
good. Federalists anticipated that the state would play an active role in 
promoting the common good. The new government incorporated dozens 
of corporations, each of which was justified on communitarian grounds. 
28. Boston Gazette, Nov. 27, 1780. 
29. Donald M. Scott, From Office to Profession: The New England Ministry, 
1750-1850 (Philadelphia, 1978); Neem, "Politics and the Origins of the Non- 
profit Corporation." 
30. Brooke, "Ancient Lodges and Self-Created Societies." See also Linda K. 
Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ith- 
aca, NY, 1970), 173-215;James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The 
Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New 
York, 1970), chapters 1 and 2; Brown, Strength of a People; David Waldstreicher, 
"The Constitution of Federal Feeling," in In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes, 53-107. 
The consensual public sphere is not simply a product of the early national era, 
but arises often in times of crisis when consent is valued over dissent. See, for 
example, Christopher Capozzola, "The Only Badge Needed Is Your Patriotic Fer- 
vor: Vigilance, Coercion, and the Law in World War I America," Journal of 
American History, 88 (Mar. 2002), 1354-82; Margaret Kolb Holden, "Freedom 
of Association in the Judicial Balance: The Ku Klux Klan, the NAACP and Liberal 
Jurisprudence in Modern America" (M.A. thesis: University of Virginia, 1989). 
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Federalists chartered turnpikes, bridges, and banks, as well as academies, 
learned societies, and charities. They increased support for Harvard 
College."' They encouraged the proliferation of Freemasonic lodges, 
hoping that the values of Masonry-fraternal love-would foster unity 
among the people.: Federalists likewise supported the public church as 
the state's primary moral institution. Dissenting voluntary churches did 
not fit into this vision of civil society. Federalists worried that such 
churches would divide the community into distinct groups with different 
values. 
Soon after the constitution went into effect, Baptists decided to test 
article 3. In the 1783 Balkcom case, a Baptist churchgoer sued the tax 
assessor in his parish for collecting taxes from him to support the paro- 
chial church. At issue was whether colonial certificate laws, which re- 
quired dissenters to file certificates with the tax collector, were still in 
effect. The county court ruled that certificates implied the subordination 
of one sect under another in violation of the constitution.:3 Isaac Backus 
and other Baptists were exuberant, proclaiming that the decision "over- 
throws the superstructure" of the establishment.34 Their joy was short- 
lived. In the 1785 case Cutter v. Frost, the state supreme court deter- 
mined that only churches incorporated by the legislature were recog- 
nized by article 3. All other bodies were purely voluntary.3" The ruling 
allowed town and parish officials to deny exemption to voluntary associ- 
ations while forcing Baptist churches to seek incorporation if they wished 
31. Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, 51-133; Daniel B. Klein, "The Vol- 
untary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early America," 
Economic Inquiry, 28 (Oct. 1990), 788-812; W. C. Kessler, "Incorporation in 
New England: A Statistical Study, 1800-1875," J7ournal of Economic History, 8 
(1948), 43-62. 
32. Steven C. Bullock, Revolutionary Brotherhood: Freemasonry and the Trans- 
formation of the American Social Order, 1730-1840 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), 
138-273. 
33. William G. McLoughlin, "The Balkcomn Case (1782) and the Pietistic The- 
ory of Separation of Church and State," William and Mary Quarterly, 24 (April 
1967), 267-83. For an earlier example, see Isaac Backus's essay in the Independent 
Chronicle, Apr. 20, 1780. 
34. Quoted in McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 1: 639. 
35. John D. Cushing, "Notes on Disestablishment in Massachusetts, 1780- 
1833," William and Mary Quarterly, 26 (April 1964), 169-90; McLoughlin, New 
England Dissent, 1: 642-48. 
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to receive legal recognition. Baptists had to choose between their com- 
mitment to the separation of church and state and their need to hold 
property and to receive taxes that would otherwise support the parish."3 
The Cutter v. Frost decision drew on an earlier case concerning Univer- 
salists. In that case, Theophilus Parsons attempted to argue that Univer- 
salists posed a threat to morality, a claim the court discarded. But the 
court agreed that only incorporated churches should be recognized 
under article 3. Arguing against Parsons was the future Republican gov- 
ernor James Sullivan. Sullivan believed that the court's decision unfairly 
excluded religious minorities "from all the benefits arising from the third 
article."7 
In 1786 the court overruled its original decision in the Murray case, 
but the legal environment for dissenters remained precarious. By 1804, 
at least six court rulings had upheld the rights of voluntary churches 
under article 3. Nonetheless, Baptists were dependent on the whims of 
local parish officers. In 1796, for example, Baptists in Harwich were 
imprisoned and their property was seized to pay the ministerial tax.38 In 
1800, Federalists passed a law to clarify any confusion, stating explicitly 
that only incorporated societies should receive the benefits of article 3.39 
The state's control over civil society was affirmed. 
In the 1790s, Federalists also faced another challenge to their vision 
of civil society: the emergence of organized political opposition. Mem- 
bers of the Republican Party organized themselves into "democratic so- 
cieties," which Federalists condemned for promoting faction and 
36. Isaac Backus, The Diary of Isaac Backus, 3 vols., ed. William G. McLoug- 
hlin (Providence, RI, 1979), 3: 1173, 1326. 
37. James Sullivan to Rufus King, June 1785, in Thomas C. Amory, Life of 
James Sullivan, 2 vols. (Boston, 1859), 1:184. See also An Appeal to the Impartial 
Public by the Society of Christian Independents (Boston, 1785); Independent 
Chronicle, Jan. 1, 1789; Jan. 29, 1789. 
38. Diary of Isaac Backus, 3: 1395. It is clear that this was not an isolated 
incident from the petitions Baptists sent to the General Court when seeking incor- 
poration. See Massachusetts Acts, ch. 31 (1790); ch. 32 (1790), both in Massa- 
chusetts State Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. 
39. "An Act providing for the Public Worship of God, and other purposes 
therein mentioned, and for repealing Laws heretofore made, relating to this sub- 
ject" (Mar. 4, 1800), Acts and Laws, Passed by the General Court of Massachusetts, 
Jan. 1800, ch. 52, pp. 405-7. See Cushing, "Disestablishment in Massachusetts," 
183. 
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rebellion. Republicans countered that they were organizing to protect 
the common good from the machinations of leaders who placed their 
own interests ahead of the people's interests. Republicans claimed that 
their private political associations better represented the true interests of 
the people than the Federalist-controlled state.4' For Federalists, this was 
unacceptable. As the people's elected leaders, they represented the peo- 
ple's will. How could a "self-created" group claim to protect the people 
from their elected leaders? The result would be an impossible "Impe- 
rium in imperio." Federalists reminded citizens that the people, "having 
freely delegated a part to act for the whole," through the principle of 
representation, "no individual man, and no body of men, is independent 
of that sovereign will."41 Republicans, like Baptists, threatened con- 
sensus. 
Despite challenging Federalist hegemony, Massachusetts Republicans 
did not initially seek to create a civil society in which private groups 
proliferated. Instead, they hoped to ensure that all corporations served 
the common good. They believed that Federalists had used their political 
power to serve their own interests at the people's expense.42 One of the 
most divisive issues concerned the status of banks. In the immediate 
postrevolutionary decades, banks, like other corporations, were consid- 
ered public institutions. Federalists, however, refused to grant banking 
charters to their Republican rivals. In 1810, Republicans hoped to create 
a new public bank that would be more firmly under the state's control. 
As Oscar and Mary Handlin argue, Republican efforts failed for two 
reasons. First, Federalists continued to defend their own corporate inter- 
ests. Second, many Republicans preferred receiving their own charters 
40. See Brooke, "Ancient Lodges and Self-Created Societies"; Elkins and 
McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 451-88; Kosclnik, "The Democratic Societies of 
Philadelphia"; Neeiii, "Freedomi of Association in the Early Republic." The classic 
work on the emergence of political parties is Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a 
Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840 
(Berkeley, CA, 1969). See also Independent Chronicle, Jan. 16, 1794; "Circular 
Letter from the Massachusetts Constitutional Society," Independent Chronicle, 
Sept. 8, 1794. 
41. Boston Columbian Centinel, Aug. 7, 1793. 
42. On Republican attitudes toward corporations, see Neem, "Politics and the 
Origins of the Nonprofit Corporation"; Paul Goodman, The Democratic-Republi- 
cans of Massachusetts: Politics in the New Republic (Cambridge, 1964), 166-81; 
Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, 106-33. 
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to allowing the state to create a new public monopoly. As both Republi- 
cans and Federalists gained a stake in banks, they concluded that in a 
partisan environment it was better to limit the state's oversight of corpo- 
rations than to permit their own corporations to fall under the control of 
the opposing party.43 
Similar debates took place over civic institutions. For example, Re- 
publicans accused the Federalist-dominated Massachusetts Medical So- 
ciety of using its corporate status to serve its members instead of the 
common good. Because Republicans were also invested in banks and 
other corporations, they preferred not to threaten the society's existing 
charter. Instead, Governor Elbridge Gerry urged his party to incorporate 
a new institution to compete with the old.44 When given the option, 
Republicans preferred public oversight of civic corporations. Thus, 
when some Federalists petitioned the General Court for a charter for 
the Massachusetts General Hospital, Republicans insisted that the new 
hospital be under public supervision.45 An impasse developed over Har- 
vard. In the 1780 constitution, the governor, the lieutenant-governor, 
the council, and the entire senate were placed on Harvard's Board of 
Overseers, continuing a tradition of public oversight that dated back to 
the college's founding. After losing the 1810 elections, Federalists re- 
moved the senate from Harvard's Board of Overseers in order to prevent 
the incoming Republican majority from controlling the college. To Re- 
publicans, it was anathema that a political minority should retain control 
of a public institution. They altered Harvard's charter back in order 
to reimpose public oversight. Federalists countered, paradoxically, that 
although Harvard was a public corporation, its charter shielded it from 
43. Dodd, American Business Corporations, 205-10; Bruce A. Campbell, "Law 
and Experience in the Early Republic: The Evolution of the Dartmouth College 
Doctrine, 1780-1819" (Ph.D. diss.: Michigan State University, 1973), 198-211; 
Goodman, Democratic-Republicans, 40-41, 170-81; Handlin and Handlin, Com- 
monwealth, 114-22. 
44. Hall, Organization of American Culture, 137-42; Joseph F. Kett, Forma- 
tion of the American Medical Profession: The Role of Institutions, 1780-1860 (New 
Haven, CT, 1968), 75-77; Goodman, Democratic-Republicans, 167-69. 
45. Ibid., 168-69; Peter Dobkin Hall, "What the Merchants Did with Their 
Money: Charitable and Testamentary Trusts in Massachusetts, 1780-1880," in 
Entrepreneurs: The Boston Business Community, 1700-1850, ed. Conrad Edick 
Wright and Katheryn P. Viens (Boston, 1997), 365-421. 
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the state. The issue was not resolved until Federalists returned to power 
in 1814, mitigating the need to distinguish between the state's and the 
college's rulers. Nonetheless, the debate over Harvard, in tandem with 
those over other corporations, illustrates how members of both parties 
were discovering that in a partisan era the state could be a fickle ally and 
a possible threat.4" 
It is in this context that we must think about the relationship between 
dissenters, particularly Baptists, and Republicans. Republicans saw Fed- 
eralist interpretations of article 3 as further proof that Federalists were 
using the state and its institutions to serve the interests of one group at 
the expense of the majority's liberty. In 1807, voters gave Republicans 
control of the legislature and elected James Sullivan governor. Dissenters 
hoped that Sullivan would clarify the legal status of churches under arti- 
cle 3 by allowing voluntary churches to receive corporate privileges. 
Although Republicans believed that freedom of conscience was a funda- 
mental right, neither Sullivan nor his party supported disestablishment. 
Instead, according to William G. McLoughlin, Sullivan sought a path 
"squarely between" Federalists and dissenters. In June, a bill was intro- 
duced granting all churches corporate privileges "whether incorporated 
or unincorporated." The proposal would have altered the structure of 
civil society by extending legal recognition to self-created associations. 
Federalists dubbed it the "infidel bill." It was rejected. In 1807, neither 
Federalists nor Republicans were willing to accept the theoretical rami- 
fications of permitting voluntary groups-even churches-to receive cor- 
porate privileges.47 
These debates came to a head in 1810. That year, in the case of 
Barnes v. Falmouth, Federalist chief justice Theophilus Parsons denied 
the right of a Universalist minister of an unincorporated church to re- 
ceive any taxes collected by the parish. Since the collection and distribu- 
46. Neem, "Politics and the Origins of the Nonprofit Corporation." 
47. This paragraph relies on William G. McLoughlin's discussion of Sullivan's 
term in New England Dissent, 2: 1065-83. See also Cushing, "Disestablishment 
in Massachusetts," 183-84. Despite Federalist hostility to a private corporations, 
Kirk Gilbert Allimian has demonstrated that Congregational churches sought char- 
ters for ministerial funds in order to insulate their endowments from the public will 
of the parish. See Alliman, "The Incorporation of Massachusetts Congregational 
Churches, 1692-1833: The Preservation of Religious Autonomy" (Ph.D. diss.: 
University of Iowa, 1970), 139-70. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.168 on Fri, 9 May 2014 18:28:12 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Neem, RELIGION AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN MASSACHUSETTS * 397 
tion of taxes was a state prerogative, it applied only to churches granted 
a charter. To assume any group of persons legally could form a public 
body was "too absurd to be admitted." The state supported public 
churches to secure "all the social and civil obligations of man to man, 
and of citizen to the state." A voluntary church with no sanction from 
the state could not be recognized.48 
To Republicans, Barnes v. Falmouth, in tandem with debates over 
banks, the Massachusetts Medical Society, and Harvard, was proof that 
Federalists were manipulating corporate law to perpetuate their power. 
Moreover, by 1810 the Baptists were an attractive voting bloc. Hoping 
to capitalize on outcry over Barnes v. Falmouth, Republicans argued 
that if every church "must make application to the government for civil 
incorporation, would not this place it in the power of political rulers to 
determine whether there should be such a public body in the Common- 
wealth as a church of Christ?"49 They pointed out that in 1780 there 
had been no incorporated religious societies; the Framers could not have 
limited article 3's application to what they could not anticipate."5 In his 
address to the legislature, Governor Elbridge Gerry noted that the court 
"has limited the right of protestant teachers" under article 3 to "incorpo- 
rated societies." Republicans should take action to protect "the liberty 
of conscience."'51 
Republicans argued that the state should not determine which 
churches were legitimate. In doing so, Republicans stretched traditional 
understandings of civil society to embrace voluntary churches. During 
the two sessions in which they controlled the legislature, they chartered 
twenty Baptist and sixteen other dissenting churches, compared to the 
previous Federalist session in which only one charter was granted to 
Baptists. Between 1790 and 1810, an average of only 2.5 Baptist 
churches were chartered annually." More importantly, in 1811 Republi- 
48. 6 Tyng 334 (1810). See also Alliman, "Incorporation of Massachusetts 
Congregational Churches," 202-206; Cushing, "Disestablishment in Massachu- 
setts," 169-90; McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 2: 1084-106. 
49. Independent Chronicle, May 20, 1811. See also Independent Chronicle, May 
15, 1811; May 27, 1811;June 13, 1811;July 4, 1811. 
50. Ibid., May 15, 1811. 
51. Columbian Centinel, June 8, 1811. 
52. Acts and Laws, Passed by the General Court of Massachusetts, 1809-1814; 
see McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 2: 1088, footnote 5, for average. 
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cans passed the Religious Freedom Act. The act reiterated the constitu- 
tional right of citizens to determine which church received their tax 
support, but added that a church need not be incorporated. With the 
passage of this act, religious freedom of association was extended to 
all citizens. Rather than being dependent on the whims of town clerks, 
legislators, and judges, dissenters could form voluntary associations with 
the privileges of incorporated ones."5 After 1811, voluntary churches 
proliferated and could no longer be considered abhorrent; yet, voluntary 
churches continued to challenge the important connection between 
church and state implied by article 3. Despite their commitment to the 
public oversight of such institutions as Harvard, Republicans helped free 
corporations from state control in the realm of religion. But, if all 
churches were legitimate, how could there be a unified civic community 
committed to the same moral ideals? Although Republicans and dissent- 
ers had constructed a sphere of free associational activity, it existed in 
tension with the parochial system. 
Orthodox Congregationalists were also beginning to turn against the pa- 
rochial system. Orthodox ministers were becoming increasingly frus- 
trated at religious liberals (Unitarians) who dominated the Federalist 
Party and controlled many parishes and institutions such as Harvard. 
Orthodox ministers sought greater control over their own churches. 
They first attempted to gain control without destroying the existing sys- 
tem. When that failed, they joined forces with dissenters to advocate 
disestablishment. 
Tensions between orthodox and liberal Congregationalists date back 
to before the Revolution. By the early nineteenth century, the line be- 
tween the two camps was becoming more defined. After a liberal was 
appointed to teach theology at Harvard, orthodox ministers founded 
Andover Seminary in 1808. Under the leadership of Jedidiah Morse, 
Andover challenged Harvard's monopoly in ministerial education, open- 
ing a rift in the communal spirit public religion was supposed to culti- 
53. "An Act Respecting Public Worship and Religious Freedom" (June 18, 
1811), Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Passed by the General Court, 
May 1800 session, ch. 6, 387. See also McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 2: 
1099-103. 
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vate.i4 Federalists condemned the new seminary for placing sectarian 
interests over the common good. One writer argued that although "the 
multiplicity of colleges may tend to the diffusion of knowledge . . . it 
likewise tends to disperse the rays." The seminary threatened the com- 
mon good by dividing the population into sects rather than collecting it 
"into one focus."" The institutions in civil society were supposed to 
reinforce consensus, not fragment the community. 
In many parishes, the majority of church members-those who had 
experienced conversion and been admitted to full membership-were 
orthodox, but liberals were able to form parochial majorities by recruit- 
ing uncommitted residents.; Orthodox leaders hoped to end this prac- 
tice by distinguishing between the church and the parish. For Federalists, 
the church was a part of the civic community, and thus there should be 
no distinction between the public it represented and the minority who 
became full members. In theory, however, the distinction between 
church and parish had existed since the colonial era. The church was a 
spiritual institution made up of visible saints; the corporate status of the 
church via the parish was a means to give a spiritual entity worldly form. 
In colonial times, the line differentiating the church and the parish was 
rarely contested. Parishioners usually deferred to church members. After 
the Revolution, however, parishioners increasingly sought to determine 
church affairs, especially the choice of a minister, making it more difficult 
for members to control their churches.57 
Orthodox leaders turned to the courts to try to demarcate a line be- 
tween the church and the parish. In the first case to reach the state 
supreme court, orthodox Congregationalists found themselves in a situa- 
tion remarkably similar to that of Baptists before 1811. In 1812, the 
court invalidated a voluntary orthodox church's effort to receive a be- 
54. Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America (Boston, 
1955); Joseph W. Phillips, Jedidiah Morse and New England Congregationalism 
(New Brunswick, NJ, 1983); Field, Crisis of the Standing Order, 141-79. 
55. [Robert H. Gardiner], "The Multiplicity of Our Literary Institutions," 
Monthly Anthology and Boston Review (March 1807), in The Federalist Literary 
Mind, ed. Lewis P. Simpson (Baton Rouge, LA, 1962), 70-72. 
56. McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 2: 1207-29. 
57. Conrad Wright, "The Dedham Case Revisited," in The Unitarian Contro- 
versy, 111-35; Alliman, "Incorporation of Massachusetts Congregational 
Churches." 
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quest made to the parish. According to the court, because the orthodox 
Calvinistic Congregational Society was voluntary, "there existed no soci- 
ety" for the state to recognize. Orthodox leaders, relying on the distinc- 
tion between the church and parish, countered that all churches are 
"voluntary associations of christians united in discipline and worship." 
The court refused to overturn the Barnes v. Falmouth precedent; in the 
absence of a charter, voluntary churches could receive no legal benefits.58 
The 1812 case was the first in which commonwealth principles 
worked against orthodox Congregationalists. That same month, a more 
controversial decision was handed down in Burr v. Sandwich. Burr, the 
settled minister in Sandwich, argued that he had been illegally dismissed 
by his parish. The central issue was whether the parish or the church 
had final authority over hiring ministers. Theophilus Parsons, who wrote 
the court's opinion, was aware that his opinion "may have a general 
influence." He ruled that the parish was a municipal body that served 
the interests of the community. While the church may be considered a 
corporation in order to hold property, it had "no power to contract with 
or to settle a minister; that power resting wholly in the parish, of which 
the members of the church, who are inhabitants, are a part." In other 
words, since the parish was a public body, all citizens residing within its 
jurisdiction and not attending other churches should be permitted to 
elect the minister.5!' 
In the nine years following Burr v. Sandwich, orthodox Congregation- 
alists tried four cases before the supreme court and lost every one."" The 
most important of these cases, Baker v. Fales, or the Dedham case, was 
decided in 1821. Like those before it, Dedham concerned the property 
of a parish."' The plaintiffs were liberal church officers who sued to 
regain control of church property following the separation of orthodox 
58. Kendall Boutell v. Thomas Cowden, Administrator, 9 Tyng 229 (1812). 
59. Jonathan Burr v. First Parish in Sandwich, 9 Tyng 250 (1812). 
60. Inhabitants of the First Parish in Shapleigh v. Zebulon Gilman, 13 Tyng 
155 (1816); Jewett v. Burroughs, 15 Tyng 412 (1819); Edward Sparrow v. Wilkes 
Wood, 16 Tyng 379 (1820); Eliphalet Baker and Another v. Samuel Fales, 16 Tyng 
403 (1820). 
61. For interesting discussions of the case, see Howe, The Garden and the 
Wilderness, 32-60; Wright, "Dedham Case Revisited." Both Howe and Wright 
argue that the court's decision did not account for the spiritual nature of the 
church as a covenanted community independent of the parish. 
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church members into a separate voluntary society. The defense argued 
that since they represented Dedham's original church, they should retain 
control over its property. The new chiefjustice Isaac Parker upheld Burr 
v. Sandwich. The parish was a public body, and thus the people "must 
have the right to have the minister of their choice set over them." If the 
church were allowed to control parochial affairs, it "would tend more 
directly to break up the whole system of religious instruction. For the 
people would never consent to be taxed for the support of men, in whose 
election they had no voice." As representatives of the people, the paro- 
chial officers retained control of their property.62 Dedham convinced or- 
thodox leaders that their interests might be better served without the 
public system. 
The debate over the corporate rights of churches spilled over into 
Massachusetts's 1820-1821 constitutional convention. Dissenters and 
some Republicans urged disestablishment. Orthodox leaders had the 
more limited goal of extending the provisions of the 1811 Religious Free- 
dom Act to themselves. Federalists countered that the public church was 
intended to serve the common good by teaching shared moral values. 
Unitarian minister Leverett Saltonstall worried that if all individuals 
could associate, it would offer "every inducement to people to cherish 
discontent and division," whereas the purpose of the constitution was to 
"promote harmony.""63 Like the men who wrote the constitution, Salton- 
stall believed that without shared institutions and values nothing would 
hold the civic community together. The enemies of the establishment 
did not prevail. The convention proposed incorporating the Religious 
Freedom Act into article 3 and allowing Congregationalists to gain its 
benefits. Balancing this enlarged freedom of association, the amendment 
authorized the state to compel unincorporated churches to support 
"public teachers," thus making voluntary churches subject to the state's 
62. At the same time that Dedham was handed down, Federalists were making 
the opposite claims about the trustees of Dartmouth College, claims that Republi- 
cans denied. Federalists argued that Dartmouth's trustees, unlike parochial offi- 
cers, were not civil servants but private actors. Federalist Chief Justice John 
Marshall sided with his party in the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
63. Journal of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates Cho- 
sen to Revise the Constitution of Massachusetts (Boston, 1853: reprint, New York, 
1970), 457-58. 
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oversight. The delegates combined the principles of both Barnes v. Fal- 
mouth and the Religious Freedom Act. Counties with large dissenting 
or orthodox populations such as Bristol, Worcester, Hampshire, and 
Berkshire opposed the amendment by large margins, perhaps because it 
granted the state new authority over voluntary churches, undermining 
the very benefits they desired."4 
In the 1820s, orthodox ministers redoubled their efforts to gain 
greater control over the state's churches. Lyman Beecher sought to con- 
vince his colleagues to seek disestablishment rather than to allow their 
churches to be controlled by the public. Beecher arrived in Massachu- 
setts from Connecticut in 1826 to take over the Park Street Church in 
the heart of Unitarian Boston. Beecher believed that a voluntary regime 
served orthodox interests. As a member of the Standing Order in Con- 
necticut, Beecher had vociferously opposed disestablishment in 1818. 
However, Beecher concluded that voluntarism was a blessing in disguise. 
Despite being worried that the "injury done to the cause of Christ was 
irreparable," he later described disestablishment as "the best thing that 
ever happened to the State of Connecticut." Following disestablishment, 
Connecticut's ministers could no longer rest on their laurels, but, "cut 
loose from dependence on state support," they had to rely "wholly on 
their own resources and on God." Beecher hoped to bring some of the 
same spirit of self-reliance to Massachusetts."' 
Beecher wasted little time entering the fray. As early as 1819, in a 
sermon preached in Salem, he had argued against Burr v. Sandwich. In 
various essays and sermons over the next decade, Beecher and his ortho- 
dox allies claimed that both ancient and colonial churches had been 
"religious societies, or voluntary associations for religious purposes, pos- 
sessing, like all other associations, the power and the right of self-organi- 
zation, preservation, deliberation, and government.""' Without the 
privileges granted other corporations, no church "could preserve itself, 
64. Ibid., 613-14, 633. 
65. Lyman Beecher, Autobiography of Lyman Beecher, ed. Barbara Cross, 2 
vols. (Cambridge, 1961) 1:252. 
66. "The Congregational Churches of Massachusetts," Spirit of the Pilgrims 
(Feb. 1828), 57-74. Since the distinction between the voluntary church as a spiri- 
tual institution and its corporate manifestation had always been unclear before the 
American Revolution, both the orthodox argument and that of liberal jurists such 
as Parsons and Parker had legitimate historical roots. 
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and its interests." Would the Supreme Court, Beecher inquired, allow 
an incorporated bank to be governed by borrowers? Religious freedom 
necessitated that churches be autonomous self-governing institutions."'7 
To the orthodox, the right of a church to choose its own minister was 
"coeval with our existence as a community.""• Orthodox leaders con- 
cluded that their religious freedom required the freedom of association 
in civil society. 
Unitarians and Federalists defended the public church. They argued 
that the parish was no different than the militia or public schools. The 
question was how to render men "better citizens" and to "secure the 
good order and preservation of the government.""" Without a common 
church, citizens "would be guided by their own perverse and depraved 
appetites."'7 While orthodoxy railed against the Unitarian elite, Unitari- 
ans responded that the people should not allow "a perpetual and odious 
aristocracy, a never dying house of lords and bishops in the church." 
How could citizens permit a small elite "to have a negative on the votes 
of the parish," a public body?71 The parish represented the people; or- 
thodox leaders wanted control of a public institution for private sectarian 
purposes. 
Orthodox leaders continued to try their hand in court, with mixed 
results. They won an important victory in 1822 when the court ruled 
that an orthodox citizen could join a church in a neighboring parish and 
be excused from paying his local taxes. By allowing people to join 
churches without regard to residence, the court challenged the parish's 
claim to be the moral voice for a geographical community. In a rare 
occurrence, the chief justice dissented. Parker noted that the 1811 Reli- 
gious Freedom Act had not intended to allow citizens to join different 
67. Lyman Beecher, A Sermon Delivered at the Installation of the Rev. Elias 
Cornelius as Associate Pastor of the Tabernacle Church in Salem, July 21, 1819 
(Andover, 1819); "The Congregational Churches of Massachusetts." 
68. "Examination of Some Laws and Judicial Decisions in Relation to the 
Churches of Massachusetts," Spirit of the Pilgrims (Mar. 1829), 128-46. 
69. "Constitution of Massachusetts," North American Review (Oct. 1820), 
359-84. 
70. Columbian Centinel (1820), quoted in McLoughlin, 2: 1151-52. 
71. "The Rights of the Congregational Churches of Massachusetts-the Result 
of an Ecclesiastical Council . . . Boston, 1827 (Review)," Christian Examiner 
(Mar.-Apr. 1827), 124-63. 
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churches of the same denomination. The current decision could com- 
pletely undermine the public church by altering the parish's municipal 
status.72 
Soon after the decision, Baptist minister Charles Train introduced a 
bill in the House amending the Religious Freedom Act to permit Con- 
gregationalists to form legally recognized voluntary churches. Train 
hoped "to place all denominations upon an equal and satisfactory 
ground." This statement can be read in two ways. Baptists wanted to do 
away with the establishment altogether. On the other hand, it was now 
the Congregationalists whose liberties were threatened. Thus, speaking 
to both denominations, Train claimed, "the old practice of vesting towns 
with corporate powers as a parish is one of the greatest evils that ever 
infested Massachusetts." The founding religious principles of the com- 
monwealth were misguided because they relied on a geographical con- 
ception of religious community instead of a voluntary one."7 In 1823, 
Republicans took advantage of orthodox frustration to elect a governor. 
Federalists made the decision easier by nominating Harrison Gray Otis, 
a participant in the Hartford Convention, a Unitarian, and a member of 
the Harvard Corporation. Republicans painted the Federalists as "con- 
nected with a Boston and Harvard College aristocracy," who were "ac- 
quiring a religious as well as political control . . . dangerous to the civil 
and religious privileges of the great body of Congregational, Baptist, 
Methodist and Episcopal friends of true religion." Republicans con- 
vinced voters that Federalists used their control of the state's civic and 
religious institutions to serve the interests of a small minority.74 Upon 
election Republicans passed a law extending the Religious Freedom Act 
to all residents. Congregationalists could now form voluntary churches 
and receive corporate privileges.7 The parish might still claim to be the 
moral voice of the community, but anybody could form a church. 
72. Holbrook v. Holbrook et al, 1 Pickering 248 (1822). Justice Samuel Wilde, 
who wrote the opinion in the case, had supported extending the Religious Free- 
dom Act to orthodox Congregationalists during the 1820-1821 convention and 
now did so from his position on the bench. See Journal of the Debates and Pro- 
ceedings, 372-75, 450, 584. 
73. McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 2: 1202-3. 
74. For elections and quotes, see Ronald P. Formisano, The Transformation of 
Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s-1840s (New York, 1983), 120-21. 
75. "An Act in addition to an Act entitled 'An Act respecting Public Worship 
and Religious Freedom,' " (Feb. 16, 1824), Laws of the Commonwealth of Massa- 
chusetts, Jan. 1824 session, ch. 106, 347. 
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Following their defeat in 1823, Federalists joined with moderate Repub- 
licans to form the National Republican Party. In the 1820s, the National 
Republicans attempted to regain some control over civil society. Nation- 
als hoped for an "era of good feelings" in which the common good 
would prevail after decades of partisanship. A debate over the composi- 
tion of civil society emerged immediately. Orthodox ministers had estab- 
lished a seminary at Amherst and, in 1823, asked for a charter. The 
petitioners framed their request around the freedom of association: 
Amherst should be incorporated "not merely as a favor from Govern- 
ment, but as a right, which all free citizens, enjoying equal rights and 
privileges, might under similar circumstances reasonably expect would 
be granted."7' Federalists and then Nationals criticized such hubris. The 
state had an interest in supporting "the institutions founded under their 
authority, on such a footing that they may be reputable and useful." 
Colleges were chartered to serve the common good, not sectarian inter- 
ests. They denied that "any body of men" could form an association 
and, "under the plea of claiming equal privileges, demand as a right that 
the government shall lend its countenance." Incorporation was a privi- 
lege, not a right.77 In 1824, Amherst's proprietors again asked for a 
charter. This time, they couched their request in traditional terms, "the 
broad basis of the public good."'78 The petition produced an intense 
debate in the House. Most Nationals argued that Amherst would weaken 
the current colleges. One legislator noted that, "by multiplying colleges 
beyond what the exigency of the community demands, you destroy the 
unity of effort in the public, which is necessary to their success. "79 Na- 
tionals continued to seek "unity" in civil society. In 1825, Amherst re- 
ceived a charter, but it contained a clause stating that the state took no 
responsibility for the college's success.80 
76. "Petition for the Incorporation of Amherst College," Boston Daily Adver- 
tiser, June 13, 1823. 
77. Ibid. 
78. Ibid., Mar. 16, 1824. 
79. Ibid., Jun. 24, 1824. See also Daily Advertiser, Aug. 13, 1824; Boston 
Courier, Aug. 14, 1824. 
80. "An Act to establish a College in the town of Amherst" (Feb. 22, 1825), 
Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Passed by the General Court, Jan. 
1825 session, ch. 84, 535. 
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A similar battle was fought in 1830 over the American Temperance 
Society (ATS). The ATS was founded by orthodox leaders who had 
abandoned the existing Society for the Suppression of Intemperance. 
When the ATS sought incorporation, a legislator proposed permitting 
any residents who paid their fees to become members. His goal was to 
prevent the ATS from serving orthodox interests by opening member- 
ship to the general public, like the parish. Representative Horace Mann 
agreed, noting that corporations were supposed to serve the public and 
not "any sect or party." The ATS's supporters responded that all citizens 
should be allowed to form their own associations. One legislator urged 
the state to permit "every Society the privilege of managing their con- 
cerns as they judge expedient." "When fair men ask for incorporation, 
are their motives to be arraigned? I think not." The amendment passed, 
leading ATS secretary John Tappan to plead for postponement. The 
Senate postponed until May. In the interim, the ATS deleted the clause 
limiting its membership."' The debate illustrates the Nationals' hostility 
to all efforts by orthodox ministers to form private societies that chal- 
lenged consensus in civil society. 
In the same period, orthodoxy had little success gaining control over 
their churches. They lost two cases in 1830. In the first, the new chief 
justice, Lemuel Shaw, vigorously defended the municipal status of the 
parish, upholding the doctrines of Burr v. Sandwich and Dedham, lead- 
ing the orthodox to respond that Shaw's decision would lead to "legal 
dependence and vassalage."'2 In the other, Democrat Marcus Morton 
also upheld precedent, but with reservations."" At issue in the case was 
whether a parish could deny the vote to a resident who had joined an 
81. The debates in the Massachusetts House of Representatives are reprinted 
in Daily Advertiser, Mar. 27, 1830; Mar. 30, 1830. See also Robert L. Hampel, 
Temperance and Prohibition in Massachusetts, 1813-18.52 (Ann Arbor, MI, 
1982), 31-32. 
82. Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pickering 171 (1830). Quotation from "[Review 
ofq Decision of thie Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in a case relating to 
the Sacramental Furniture of a Church in Brookfield; with the entire Arguments 
of Hon. Samuel Hoar, Jr., for the Plaintiff, and of Hon. Lewis Strong, for the 
Defendant (Boston, 1832)," Spirit of the Pilgrims (July 1832), 402-24. For a 
discussion of Shaw's ruling and the orthodox response, see Leonard Levy, The 
Law of the Commonwealth and ChiefJustice Shaw (Cambridge, 1957), 29-42. 
83. Oakes v. Hill, 10 Pickering 333 (1830). 
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orthodox voluntary church and then left it. The parish's attorneys ar- 
gued that parishes ought to have the "same rights as other corporations," 
including the right to "refuse to admit him as a member." Otherwise, 
"the liberty granted to citizens, of forming themselves into separate asso- 
ciations . . . would be rendered of little value." At issue was the freedom 
to associate in civil society. Morton's ruling was "adopted reluctantly," 
and only because "the law will admit of no other reasonable construc- 
tion." Morton considered the parochial system "better suited to the early 
state of the country," when the community was more homogeneous. In 
1830, all individuals who "happen to reside upon the same territory" 
did not attend the same church, the basis for the 1780 "constitution of 
civil society." Morton and other Democrats urged the state to acknowl- 
edge the existence of religious diversity and cease efforts to force an 
artificial common system upon the people. 
Following 1830, orthodox Congregationalists and dissenters started 
to call for disestablishment. Ending tax support for the church also 
meant the end of the commonwealth experiment, an end to the idea that 
Massachusetts was "one moral whole." Citizens of Massachusetts would 
have to accept the existence of moral conflict in civil society. In 1830, 
petitions from Congregationalists of both camps, from Baptists, and from 
Universalists started to pour into the legislature calling for disestablish- 
ment. In 1831, a legislative committee supported disestablishment. The 
House, composed of about sixty to seventy Democrats, a few Antima- 
sons, and a majority of National Republicans, approved an amendment, 
but the Senate, dominated by National Republicans, voted it down.84 
Disestablishment became central to that fall's elections. Democrats 
wholeheartedly supported disestablishment as part of their larger pro- 
gram against monopolies, while Nationals defended the public system.8" 
Even on the eve of disestablishment in 1833, the Unitarian Christian 
Examiner argued that taxpayers should support the public church be- 
cause "you are so unfortunate as to belong to a nation.""86 Antimasons 
echoed Democrats and condemned Nationals for their willingness to tax 
the majority to support a minority."7 The orthodox Spirit of the Pilgrims 
84. McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 2: 1217-19. 
85. Boston Statesman, Feb. 19, 1831. 
86. "Defence of Article Three," Christian Examiner (January 1833), 351-63. 
87. Paul Goodman, Towards a Christian Republic: Antimasonry and the Great 
Transition in New England, 1826-1836 (New York, 1988), 166-67; Formisano, 
Transformation of Political Culture, 219. 
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argued that disestablishment would better serve orthodox churches by 
freeing them from the parish's control."8 During 1832, more petitions 
came in. Nationals, who were reorganizing into the Whig Party in 1833, 
must have understood that it was better to rid themselves of the issue 
than to have voters turn to the Democrats or Antimasons. As a result, 
the Senate confirmed the amendment on March 1, 1833, and voters 
ratified it 32,234 to 3,273. In 1833 there remained little popular support 
for the public church."8" In accord with the amendment, the legislature 
passed a law granting voluntary churches corporate privileges.!'" Having 
lost the battle over the public church, the three key elements in Massa- 
chusetts politics-Democrats, Whigs, and the orthodox-would now try 
to make sense of how to reconcile the common good with the reality of 
pluralism in civil society. 
Disestablishment was premised on the separation of church and state 
and the freedom to associate and receive corporate privileges in civil 
society. It marked the symbolic end of the "consensual public sphere." 
In civil society, individuals would now be permitted to organize them- 
selves into private moral communities. The state was no longer the sole 
moral voice of the people. Democrats and Whigs responded differently 
to the new climate. For Democrats, disestablishment was part of their 
larger campaign against corporate monopolies. They supported increas- 
ing access to corporate privileges to all groups in the market and in civil 
society. Democrats had two aims. The first was to promote equality by 
preventing the state from favoring special corporate interests. The sec- 
ond was to promote economic and civic prosperity by fostering competi- 
tion.•" In their 1830 address, Democrats argued: 
88. "Third Article in the Declaration of Rights," Spirit of the Pilgrims (Dec. 
1831), 629-48. 
89. The narrative on disestablislhnent is taken from McLoughlin, New England 
Dissent, 2: 1245-62. 
90. "An Act relating to Parishes and Religious Freedom" (Apr. 1, 1834), Laws 
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Passed at the Several Sessions of the General 
Court, Jai. 1834 session, ch. 183, 265. 
91. This ideology can be seen most clearly in the controversy over the Charles 
River Bridge. Whigs urged protectilg the bridge's monopoly, while Democrats 
supported chartering a new bridge that would compete with the old one. The 
colitroversy resulted in the importanlt U.S. Supreme Court case, Proprietors of 
Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). See 
Stanley I. Kutler, Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge 
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Monopolies of various grades and characters, from exclusive privilege in banking, 
to an exclusive right to bridge navigable streams-from a compulsory support of a 
religious order, to unfair exemptions and exclusive privileges to members of the 
learned professions-from entails by literary and religious mortmains, to private 
entails in life annuities and life Insurance offices, have been the favourite means by 
which the federal party has built up an Aristocracy, and sought to establish its 
permanency. Their banking monopoly crumbled beneath the democratic power in 
1811: and by the wisdom of that measure which brought life into the State Bank, 
and established the principle that all were alike entitled to bank Corporations.... 
At the same period and by the same party, the link which in some degree bound 
together Church and State, was broken assunder." 
Whether in the market or civil society, whether banks or churches, state- 
granted monopolies threatened democratic equality and stifled progress. 
Ideally, "there would be no monopolies or exclusive privileges. For his 
standing and wealth, each man would rely on his own integrity and 
industry. Each would enjoy his freedom of religion unmolested, content 
that his neighbor, whether Christian, Jew, Mahometan, or Pagan, should 
do the same."'9 In religion and economics, the common good would 
best be promoted by competition between groups. 
Nationals and then Whigs responded differently to disestablishment 
and pluralism. They attempted to restore some civic unity by supporting 
a more effective public school system.94 They also continued to believe 
that disinterested statesmen were the most capable leaders. As Daniel 
Walker Howe argues, Whigs believed that virtuous leaders needed to be 
self-governing and autonomous, and thus capable of acting independent 
of interest.95 They applied the same logic to their institutions. Harvard's 
Case (Philadelphia, 1971); Formisano, Transformation of Political Culture, 191- 
96. On the Democrats' ideology, in addition to the above, see Arthur Darling, 
Political Changes in Massachusetts, 1824-1848: A Study of Liberal Movements in 
Politics (New Haven, CT, 1925). 
92. Boston Statesman, Feb. 13, 1830. 
93. "The Government and its Duties," Boston Statesman, Aug. 20, 1831. 
94. Rush Welter, Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America 
(New York, 1962); Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform: Educa- 
tional Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts (Cambridge, 1968). 
95. Daniel Walker Howe has developed this thesis in several works: The Uni- 
tarian Conscience: Harvard Moral Philosophy, 1806-1861 (Cambridge, 1970); 
The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago, 1979); Making the Ameri- 
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president Josiah Quincy suggested removing all state oversight in order 
to insulate the college from the "politico-theological sea" of democracy.", 
Rather than maintain close ties to the state, Whigs increasingly turned to 
private corporate institutions that they managed independently.97 Both 
enlightened leaders and enlightened institutions must be shielded from 
special interests. Like Democrats, Whigs accepted a division between the 
affairs of corporate institutions and the state, albeit for different reasons. 
Orthodox leaders had no intention of losing public influence. Al- 
though they had long argued that the freedom of association was neces- 
sary for religious liberty, they remained committed to promoting their 
vision of the good society, as Jonathan Sassi has recently demonstrated."9 
Ministers like Lyman Beecher anticipated exerting great influence in civil 
society. One of the sources of orthodox confidence was their own suc- 
cess in forming and managing moral reform societies. By 1833, orthodox 
ministers were involved with the reform associations that made up the 
Benevolent Empire, and they had recruited thousands of middle-class 
women and men into local auxiliaries.'"' They realized that they could 
can Self Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Cambridge, 1997); and "Protes- 
tantism, Voluntarismn, and Personal Identity in Antebellum America," in New 
Directions in American Religious History, ed. Harry S. Stout and D. G. Hart 
(New York, 1997), 206-38. See also Katz, Irony of Early School Reform; David J. 
Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New 
Republic (1971; reprint, New York, 2002); D. H. Meyer, The Instructed Con- 
science: The Shaping of the National Ethic (Philadelphia, 1972); Joseph F. Kett, 
Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America, 1790 to the Present (New York, 1977); 
J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philoso- 
phy (New York, 1998). 
96. Quincy quoted in Robert McCaughey, Josiah Quincy, 1772-1864: The 
Last Federalist (Cambridge, 1974), 190-94. 
97. Robert F. Dalzell, Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World 
They Made (Cambridge, MA, 1987), 113-63; Hall, "What the Merchants Did 
with Their Money." 
98. Jonathan D. Sassi, "The First Party Competition and Southern New En- 
gland's Public Christianity," Journal of the Early Republic, 21 (Sunmner 2001), 
261-99, and A Republic of Righteousness: The Public Christianity of the Post- 
revolutionary New England Clergy (New York, 2001). 
99. Cliffbrd S. Griffin, Their Brothers' Keepers: Moral Stewardship in the 
United States, 1800-1865 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1960); Perry Miller, The Life of 
the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (New York, 1965), 3-95; 
Donald G. Mathews, "The Second Great Awakening as an Organizing Process, 
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rely on a broad public, including many people who had been converted 
at revivals, to support their reform goals. These societies would diffuse 
the right moral principles among the public. In time, Beecher hoped, the 
moral diversity that had forced disestablishment would itself disappear: 
"By voluntary efforts, societies, missions, and revivals," ministers could 
"exert a deeper influence" than by state coercion.10" 
Orthodox voters continued to believe that they represented the moral 
voice of the community. As a result, many were drawn to the Antima- 
sonic party, which claimed to represent the values of "the people" and 
accused both parties of being hopelessly corrupted by Freemasonry."" 
Antimasons attacked Masonry for two reasons, its secret influence over 
political leaders and its moral principles. Orthodox minister Nathanael 
Emmons stated in 1832 that Masonry was the "darkest and deepest plot 
ever formed in this wicked world against the true God, the true religion, 
and the temporal and eternal interests of mankind."102 Antimasons 
demanded that the state revoke the Boston Grand Lodge's charter. In 
response, Whigs defended the Masons' freedom to associate. They ac- 
1780-1830: An Hypothesis," American Quarterly, 21 (Spring 1969), 23-43; 
Conrad Edick Wright, The Transformation of Charity in Postrevolutionary New 
England (Boston, 1992). 
100. Beecher, Autobiography, 1: 253. 
101. There are clear links between orthodox Congregationalism and Antima- 
sonry's electoral success. See Formisano, Transformation of Political Culture, 
213, 217-21; Goodman, Towards a Christian Republic, 54-79, 163-76; Mark 
Voss-Hubbard, "The 'Third Party Tradition' Reconsidered: Third Parties and 
American Public Life, 1830-1900," Journal of American History, 86 (June 1999), 
121-50. Many historians have noted the importance of evangelical ministers to 
the spread of Antimasonry. In western New York, where Antimasonry originated, 
evangelical churches were one of the central nodes in the communication of Anti- 
masonic sentiment, according to Kathleen Smith Kutolowski, "Antimasonry Reex- 
amined: Social Bases of the Grass-Roots Party," Journal of American History, 71 
(Sept. 1984), 269-93, esp. 279-82. Brooke, Heart of the Commonwealth, 319-52, 
argues that in Worcester County, Antimasonry was strongest among those ortho- 
dox voters who remained committed to the communitarian ideals of the common- 
wealth. Many of these voters were less likely to be involved in evangelical reform 
and may have opposed disestablishment. 
102. Goodman, Towards a Christian Republic, 54-79, 147-76. Emmons 
quoted in ibid., 57. Similar arguments to those of the Antimasons were made to 
oppose the Ku Klux Klan's freedom of association in the 1920s and the NAACP's 
in the 1950s. See Holden, "Freedom of Association in the Judicial Balance." 
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cused Antimasons of attempting "to erect a majority into a despotism" 
by organizing in civil society."'3 (In 1833, however, after the Antimasons 
threatened the Whigs' control of the state, Whigs convinced the Grand 
Lodge to voluntarily surrender its charter.114) The Antimasonic attack on 
the Masons' charter illustrates the shallowness of many orthodox leaders' 
commitment to the freedom of association in civil society when that free- 
dom threatened what they considered moral truth. 
In 1833, Antimasons proclaimed that they sought not "the mere tri- 
umph of party," but of "moral and political principles."'115 This antiparty 
language struck a deep chord among orthodox voters who remained 
committed to the ideals of the commonwealth.""' Nationals responded 
that if the Antimasons "are not a party, what are they? They are not the 
whole community.""17 Antimasons, like Federalists and Republicans in 
the 1790s, conflated themselves and "the people." By the 1830s, both 
Democrats and Whigs had abandoned such language and had even ac- 
cepted the benefits of conflict. In 1829, Democrats stated: "Strong colli- 
sions between the parties, like some violent diseases in the human 
system, which when once overcome by a good constitution, often tend 
to purify the body."' 18 Whigs agreed. Governor George Briggs noted 
that "the security of liberty is increased by such divisions," continuing, 
"differences of opinion upon measures best calculated to promote the 
103. Daily Advertiser, Oct. 3, 1831 (reprinted from the National Gazette). Ar- 
guments similar to those of the Whigs were used to limit the actions of labor 
unions in the early republic, suggesting that unions may associate but they may 
not impose their will on others through coerced collective bargaining. See Levy, 
"Labor Law. Trade Unions and Criminal Conspiracy," in Law of the Common- 
wealth and Chief Justice Shaw, 183-206; Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, 
and Ideology in the Early American Republic (Cambridge, 1993); Neemi, "Freedom 
of Association in the Early Republic." 
104. Daily Advertiser, Jan. 1, 1834. 
105. Quoted in Goodman, Towards a Christian Republic, 108. 
106. Goodman, Towards a Christian Republic; Brooke, Heart of the Common- 
wealth, 347-49. 
107. Daily Advertiser, Oct. 4, 1831. 
108. Boston Statesman,,Jan. 31, 1829. For changing conceptions of party com- 
petition, see Michael Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party in the United States, 
1815-1828," American Historical Review, 74 (Dec. 1968), 453-91; Hofstadter, 
The Idea of a Party System; Ralph Ketcham, Presidents above Party: The First 
American Presidency, 1789-1829 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1984). For Massachusetts, 
see Formisano, Transformation of Political Culture. 
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public good, lead to discussion, and discussion leads to the discovery of 
truth.""•"• Both parties concluded that partisan competition was better 
suited to democracies than allowing any one group to speak exclusively 
for the people. 
Whigs considered orthodox evangelicals a private interest that threat- 
ened the common good. Especially after disestablishment, orthodox 
churches and their reform associations could no longer claim to speak 
for the community."1 The most elaborate critique of evangelicals came 
from future Whig William Ellery Channing in 1829. Observing the rise 
of the Benevolent Empire, Channing commented, "everything is done 
now by Societies." In such societies, citizens would defer to the judg- 
ment of the group instead of relying on themselves. In contrast, virtuous 
citizens should learn "resistance of social influences, or of impressions 
from our fellow beings." Religious revivalism combined with evangelical 
associationalism was a "contagion" that swept individuals away. In time, 
civil society would be controlled by a few ministers, who, "by an artful 
multiplication of Societies, devoted apparently to different objects," 
would dominate public life and create "despotism." Echoing comments 
made by Federalists about Republicans in the 1790s, Channing accused 
the orthodox of forming "a kind of irregular government.""' Channing's 
accusations were not entirely misguided. As their support of Antima- 
sonry demonstrates, orthodox ministers and many of their followers be- 
lieved that they represented the moral majority against a political elite 
hostile to their values. 
Democrats agreed with Channing. In 1839, one writer praised Chan- 
ning's comments, stating that evangelical voluntary associations posed "a 
greater danger to the freedom of our political institutions than standing 
armies." Associations threatened "independence of thought and action" 
and enabled "designing men" to control public opinion."2 Evangelicals 
109. Resolves of the General Court (1844). See also "Origin and Character of 
the Old Parties," North American Review, 34 (July 1834), 208-68. 
110. See, for example, the debates over public education and Horace Mann's 
critique of orthodox sectarians, in Raymond B. Culver, Horace Mann and Religion 
in the Massachusetts Public Schools (New Haven, CT, 1929). 
111. [William Ellery Channing], "Associations," Christian Examiner (Sept. 
1829), 105-40. Reprinted in William Ellery Channing, The Works of William E. 
Channing, ed. by the American Unitarian Association (Boston, 1890), 138-58. 
112. Democratic Review (Mar. 1839), as quoted in Lawrence F. Kohl, The 
Politics of Individualism: Parties and the American Character in the Jacksonian 
Era (New York, 1989), 29. 
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now posed the same threat to liberty as corporate monopolies; in both 
cases, a powerful (private) elite exerted disproportionate control over 
public life. "Matters have come to such a pass," commented one Demo- 
crat, "that a peaceable man can hardly venture to eat or drink, to go to 
bed or to get up, to correct his children or kiss his wife, without obtain- 
ing the permission and the direction of some moral or other reform soci- 
ety.""' Having supported disestablishment, Democrats now worried that 
evangelicals were gaining too much power in civil society. 
Orthodox evangelicals disagreed with the attacks coming from both 
parties. In response to Channing's essay, an orthodox writer noted that 
Channing sought to make all individuals "islands" cut loose from their 
social relations. The result would be rabid individualism, exactly the 
opposite of what most Whigs desired. Moreover, the writer argued, 
Channing's comments on revivalism were religious prejudice. "Revivals 
are the work of the Holy Spirit," and the various causes evangelicals 
promoted-from missionary work, to Bible distribution, to observance 
of the Sabbath-were not private interests but communal ones, derived 
from the will of their god."4 Far from being a special interest in civil 
society, evangelicals believed that were acting out their god's plan, and 
thus the best interests of the people."" They did not accept the conces- 
sions both parties had made to pluralism. From a philosophical stand- 
point, pluralism requires one to accept that there exists no monopoly on 
truth and that truth-seeking is aided by the expression of and competi- 
tion between competing ideas.'"" To evangelicals, there was one truth. 
Although they used similar arguments as Democrats to disestablish the 
church, they ultimately hoped to reform society in their own image. Like 
Whigs, evangelicals believed that the state must promote the common 
113. "Ultraismi," Boston Quarterly Review, 1 (July 1838), 377-84. 
114. "An Article on Associations in the Christian Examiner, September 1829," 
Spirit of the Pilgrims, 3 (Mar. 1830), 129-41. 
115. Griffin, Their Brothers' Keepers; Jolhn L. Tllomas, "Romantic Reform in 
America, 1815-1865," American Quarterly, 17 (Winter 1965), 656-81; Ronald 
G. Walters, American Reformers, 1815-1860 (New York, 1978); Robert H. 
Abzug, Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform and the Religious Imnagination (New 
York, 1994); Mark Y. Hanley, Beyond a Christian Commonwealth: The Protestant 
Quarrel with the American Republic, 1830-1860 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1994). 
116. On this issue, see Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas 
in America (New York, 2002), esp. 377-408. 
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good. However, they reversed the Whigs' framework. Rather than seeing 
the state and its leaders as above the private interests of civil society, they 
accused the state of promoting the interests of a particular party and sect. 
The voice of the people could be heard in civil society. 
These issues were brought to a head in various conflicts over moral 
reform during the second party system. Because of limited space, this 
essay will not go into detail."7 However, some suggestions can be made. 
By creating a mass social movement in civil society oriented around par- 
ticular visions of the good society, evangelicals raised new questions 
about the relationship between citizens acting in the public sphere and 
the state."" All involved were uncertain how a social movement in civil 
society ought to behave. Should voluntary associations be allowed to 
promote political change, thus threatening the boundary between civil 
society and the state? Or should associations advocate only voluntary 
remedies, relying on persuasion but not coercion? When and how could 
a special interest prove that it is the public interest? 
Disestablishment had stripped the state of its transcendent justifica- 
tion. Instead, political leaders accepted the importance of the freedom of 
association in civil society to religious liberty. Evangelicals did not always 
accept this distinction. In debates over sabbatarianism, they claimed that 
the state should enforce their god's laws."•' Democrats were extremely 
117. On debates over the role of voluntary associations in the antebellum era, 
see Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, "Restrictive Associations," in The Dimen- 
sions of Liberty, ed. Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin (Cambridge, 1961), 
113-32; David Brion Davis, ed., Ante-bellum Reform (New York, 1967). On evan- 
gelicalism and moral reform in antebellum politics, see Bertram Wyatt-Brown, 
"Prelude to Abolitionism: Sabbatarianism and the Rise of the Second Party Sys- 
tem," Journal of American History, 58 (Sept. 1971), 316-41; Richard R. John, 
"Taking Sabbatarianism Seriously: The Postal System, the Sabbath, and the 
Transformation of American Political Culture," Journal of the Early Republic, 10 
(1990), 517-67; Daniel Walker Howe, "The Evangelical Movement and Political 
Culture in the North during the Second Party System," Journal of American 
History, 77 (Mar. 1991), 1216-39; Richard J. Carwardine, Evangelicals and Poli- 
tics in Antebellum America (Knoxville, TN, 1997). 
118. Eugene E. Leach, "Social Reform Movements," in Encyclopedia ofAmeri- 
can Social History, ed. Mary Kupiec Cayton, 3 vols. (New York, 1993), 3: 
2201-30. 
119. Spirit of the Pilgrims, 28 (Mar. 1829), 142-66. For a discussion of the 
tension between religious communitarianism and liberalism in the new republic, 
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hostile to any effort to link church and state. As a writer argued, "to 
construe one's own liberty of conscience, so as to interfere with another's 
liberty of conscience, is to misconstrue it.1'1"2 By seeking to reimpose 
moral uniformity through the use of public policy, whether by compel- 
ling citizens to observe the Sabbath or by prohibiting the sale of alcohol, 
and by claiming to speak for "the people," evangelicals risked destroying 
the boundary between civil society and the state that made their organiz- 
ing possible. Orthodox leaders had helped expand the freedom of associ- 
ation in civil society in order to free their churches from the state. By 
employing religious arguments, however, they implied that a private 
movement in civil society now had the moral authority once held by the 
state. Moreover, they argued that the state should impose their vision of 
morality on the public, replicating the very problem that led them to 
support disestablishment.121 
In addition to church-state questions, the reformers raised an entirely 
different issue about democratic politics: what role should citizens in 
civil society play in public life? Both parties depicted the moral reformers 
as private interests that were gaining too much power. Yet, by bringing 
thousands of previously inactive citizens into public life, evangelicals, 
like political parties, helped create mass democracy. Evangelicals be- 
lieved that public opinion was on their side, and thus they had every 
right to seek political change. They wondered why citizens in civil soci- 
ety should not be allowed to promote what they consider to be the com- 
mon good. 
Evangelicals created America's first mass protest movement, and 
taught thousands how to organize. The same strategies, and many of the 
same people, would be involved in the abolitionist and later the female 
see Mark D. McGarvie, One Nation Under Law: America's Early National Strug- 
gles to Separate Chuirch and State (DeKalb, IL, 2005). 
120. "Religion and Politics," Boston Quarterly Review, 1 (Jul. 1838), 310-33, 
at 323. 
121. Inl Beyond a Christian Commonwealth, Mark Hanley argues that Protes- 
tant evangelicals had a "quarrel with the American republic." They opposed the 
liberal, imorally lax, and acquisitive society that was emerging in Jacksonian 
Ammerica. However, orthodox Congregationalists in Massachusetts helped create 
that world by pushing for the freedomi of association as a necessary correlate to 
the freedom of conscience. By continuing to speak as if they held a monopoly on 
mioral authority, they comntradicted their own arguments. 
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suffrage movements. Again, the same objections would be made: slavery 
is not a proper issue for legislation; women are not proper political 
actors. Abolitionists and suffragists would be criticized for attempting to 
force their agendas onto the political stage by forming associations, hold- 
ing conventions, publishing papers, and pressuring policymakers, all 
tools used by activists on behalf of sabbatarianism and temperance. His- 
torians who have traced the emergence of liberalism in American law 
and politics have tended to condemn such reformers for seeking "social 
control" instead of coming to terms with the pluralistic nature of liberal 
democracy. 22 However, the communitarian impulses of the revolution- 
ary era lived on and reformers used their new associations to promote 
them. The same can be said for subsequent reform movements in Ameri- 
can history, including those during the Populist and Progressive eras as 
well as in more recent history. 23 On the one hand, by definition move- 
ments in civil society are private. Unlike elected leaders, they cannot 
speak for the people of their jurisdiction. On the other hand, the new 
civil society opened up an arena for citizens to debate the public interest. 
Citizens claimed their right to take part in deliberations over public 
polices and public values. The challenge of American democracy is how 
to sustain these debates over the common good without recreating the 
problems faced by leaders and citizens during the decades following the 
Revolution. 
122. Griffin, Their Brothers' Keepers; Charles Foster, An Errand of Mercy: The 
Evangelical United Front, 1790-1825 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1960); Paul S. Boyer, 
Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920 (Cambridge, 1978); Paul 
E. Johnson, A Shopkeeper's Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New 
York, 1815-1837 (New York, 1978); R. J. Morris, "Voluntary Societies and British 
Urban Elites, 1780-1850: An Analysis," Historical Journal, 26 (1983), 95-118. 
For a critique, see Lois W. Banner, "Religious Benevolence as Social Control: 
A Critique of an Interpretation" Journal of American History, 60 Uune 1973), 
23-41. 
123. See Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New 
York, 1995); Elisabeth S. Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation 
and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago, 
1997). 
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